This paper uses a national survey of 200 Chinese town and village enterprises (TVEs) from 1985 to 1990 to explore empirically the effect of contractual arrangements on the performance of enterprises under Chinese institutional conditions. A theoretical model that emphasizes a potentially important role for local government effort in a situation of doublesided moral hazard is developed to explain why the share profit system may produce better incentives than the quota profit system. The paper shows that, from a profit maximization perspective, the trend away from share profit contracts to quota profit contracts among Chinese TVEs in the late 1980s may have been premature.
INTRODUCTION
While broad literature surveys point to more complex possibilities (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989) , applications of the contractual structure of the firm generally argue that the least easily monitored agent whose effort makes the most difference to output should be the residual claimant (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983) . In a modern firm where ownership is separated from management and, hence, where firm performance may be subject to managerial shirking or malfeasance, it is usually argued that these difficulties can best be avoided by making the manager a residual claimant. This is typically done by tying the manager's reward directly to the profit. Since this can be accomplished in a variety of ways, it is viewed as a relatively risk-free general solution. In Western corporations, the manager's reward is often tied to profits by making the manager a shareholder.
In Chinese agriculture, the weak performance of collective agriculture prompted the introduction of the household responsibility system in which peasant households have to pay a fixed amount to the land owner, i.e., local government, but have the right to the residual profit or rent (Lin, 1988) . Given the early, substantial, and widely recognized success of the household responsibility system in agriculture, a major focus of industrial reform in China has been the introduction of the industrial responsibility system, a system in which managers and/or workers share the profit with the government or commit to deliver a certain amount of profit, i.e., the target profit or quota, to the owner, i.e., the government, but have the right to retain a substantial portion of the residual. While this system has only recently been introduced on a partial basis in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), since the mid 1980s the industrial responsibility system has penetrated much more deeply nonstateowned enterprises, the most important of which are the nonstate collective township and village enterprises (TVEs).
Before 1979, TVEs had contracts similar to those of SOEs in that managers were government-appointed and often were selected from the ranks of those with long experience in local and regional government. Reliable officials were trusted to operate TVEs for a fixed salary, i.e., on a wage contract basis, implying that the local government, i.e., a county, town, or village, was the residual claimant, instead of the manager. By 1983, however, the responsibility system borrowed from agriculture was already widespread among TVEs. Profit rate (before taxes) 17.3% 6.8% 6.3%
in TVEs, making it virtually impossible to characterize properly the types of contracts in existence and their changes over time. Using a small sample for a particular region of unknown representativeness, Chen (1995) and Chen and Rozelle (1996) characterize the changes as switching from fixed wage contracts to share contracts and, eventually, to fixed rent or quota-profit contracts. The latter, however, were confined largely to the smaller and more private TVEs. To our knowledge, the only available national sample of TVEs is the one of relatively large TVEs developed by the Rural Economy Research Center of the Ministry of Agriculture in collaboration with the World Bank. On the basis of contractual information collected from this national sample of 200 TVEs presented in Table 1 , it is clear that, even as early as 1985, the majority of the contracts allowed the managers and/or workers to take a portion of the residual claims via quota-profit contracts (QP), share-profit contracts (SP), or some other means (OTH). Moreover, the relative importance of quotaprofit contracts increased sharply between 1985 and 1990, the latest year for which such information is available from such firms. Indeed, in neither 1989 nor 1990 did as much as 10% of the firms in the sample compensate their managers by fixed-wage contracts in which the entire residual profit would go to the local government owners (ALLG).
According to the standard view of contractual incentives, the observed trend toward quota contracts should provide greater incentives for earning profits and, thereby, increase profits. Nevertheless, as is also shown in Table  1 , profit rates in this sample of Chinese TVEs fell rather sharply from 17.3% in 1985 to 6.8% in 1989 and then again to 6.3% in 1990. The numbers of TVEs with negative profits increased from 5 to 33 and those in bankruptcy from 0 to 13 between 1985 and 1990. The falling profit rate could be attributable largely to the rather severe anti-inflationary credit constraints imposed by the monetary authorities on all firms, but especially on TVEs, during the years 1989-1991, and to the rapid growth of TVEs and market competition.
Nevertheless, the fact that it coincided almost exactly with the sharp trend in contractual type from SP contracts to QP contracts serves to cast some doubt on the superiority of contracts in which the manager is the residual claimant. If QP contracts are optimal, even for Chinese TVEs, why would not their widespread introduction in the late 1980s have reduced the fall in TVE profitability?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate this issue empirically using the data on profit rates and contractual types from this rather unique sample of Chinese TVEs. The alternative hypothesis is that quota contracts are optimal only under ideal conditions that do not prevail in China. No contracts are perfect; all are vulnerable to one or more forms of opportunism in the terminology of Williamson (1985) . Not surprisingly, several shortcomings of QP fixed-rent contracts are well known. One shortcoming is the vulnerability to asset misuse since, if the quota contract is of limited duration, the managers and workers will have an incentive to overuse the assets and skimp on maintenance and replacement. Substantial long-run profits may be traded for modest increases in short-run profits against the owner's interest.
Another well-known shortcoming is that the QP contract may be difficult to enforce. Because of the low level of income among rural residents and severe imperfections in capital markets, the managers can seldom pay the fixed quota in advance. Although managers are asked to make a down payment of collateral, i.e., a performance bond, in advance of the contract, such payments are usually small, relative to the quota itself; hence, they may not be effective in reducing the incidence of below-quota (or negative) profits. The owner's only option is to fire the manager and make use of the collateral. Still another shortcoming of QP contracts is that the quota can be increased in subsequent years on the basis of good performance, thereby diminishing the incentive for good performance.
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Rather than focusing on these well-known shortcomings, our emphasis is on a feature that has special relevance in the context of Chinese TVEs. The local government can play an important role in helping its TVEs to succeed in an environment characterized by the incompleteness and imperfection of various markets, especially those of critical raw materials, intermediate goods, capital, and marketing capabilities, or access to markets (McMillan, 1997; Whiting, 1995 Whiting, , 1996 . When such conditions prevail, quota contracts may be inferior to other contracts because the reward that the local government would receive is invariant to the performance of the TVE and, hence, also to any effort that the local government provides. As a result, there is less incentive for local officials to help overcome the bottlenecks TVEs commonly face with respect to input supply, finance, and marketing. On the other hand, local SHARE VS QUOTA officials are well-placed to help TVEs in these respects. 4 Since the market for managerial skills may also be incomplete since managerial effort is not easily measured and monitored, the situation could be considered one of double-sided moral hazard. Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) developed a model of sharecropping in which, under certain conditions and when each of two parties has a comparative advantage in supplying a nonmarketable input, both parties can benefit from a share contract. Inspired by that model, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) developed a model of double-sided moral hazard in the context of franchising in which, under certain conditions, share contracts are optimal. Yet, these authors provide no systematic empirical support for the model. Even the more recent empirical studies on the comparative efficiency of sharecropping have provided little support for the Eswaran-Kotwal explanation, despite its seeming plausibility.
5
In this paper, we provide some evidence on double-sided moral hazard among Chinese TVEs. If double-sided moral hazard is present in Chinese TVEs, the trend toward QP contracts may have been ill-advised; SP contracts would have been more conducive to efficient operations and higher profit rates than QP contracts. In Section II, we provide a model of the Chinese TVE with double-sided moral hazard and derive implications suggesting that SP contracts are superior to QP contracts under certain conditions. In Section III, we use panel data to isolate interfirm differences from contractual differences and offer econometric evidence based on the experience with changes in contractual form among the same sample of 200 TVEs, showing that SP contracts yield higher profit rates than QP contracts. Section IV presents some evidence demonstrating the imperfections in Chinese product and factor markets and the important role of local governments. Section V contains our conclusions.
THE MODEL
In this section, we construct a model explaining the contractual relationship between the firm and the local government of the town where the firm is located in terms of double-sided moral hazard. The local government sets some targets on production, profit, and employment for the firm and designs a corresponding reward system that provides incentives for the firm to fill the assigned objectives. In the absence of well-defined property rights and in view of the scarcity of several key resources, the local government plays an important role in the success of the firm as argued by Chang and Wang (1994) , Naughton (1994), and Li (1996) .
In particular, the local government provides both scarce energy inputs at planned prices and the initial capital of the firm. Since the Chinese economic system is still highly centralized, the local government can help firms gain access to product markets, e.g. export markets, and can negotiate subcontracting relationships with SOEs. Moreover, its guarantees can serve as collateral for loan capital through a highly regionalized banking system.
As detailed in Nugent, Perrigne, and Qiu (1996) , the relationships in which TVE managers, workers, and owners are embedded constitute a complex incentive scheme in which each party has a strong interest in the firm's profitability and provides effort that contributes to profit. However, the local government receives only an imperfect signal in the form of the realized profit rate of the effort of TVE managers and workers. Likewise, the latter receive only imperfect signals of the effort of the local government, e.g., through the inputs provided at planned prices.
Under the assumption that there is asymmetric information between the two parties, principal agent theory has identified two main problems. First, adverse selection arises from hidden information on the efficiency of the firm or of the local government. Second, moral hazard is due to an unobserved action, here, the effort of both parties. 6 The theory of contracts addresses the problem of designing contracts in the light of these two problems of asymmetric information (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987) . However, because of the longterm relationship between the local government, the manager, and the workers, all of whom come from the same community, we assume that individual efficiencies are mutually known.
7 Therefore, we avoid the adverse selection problem and focus on the double-sided moral hazard problem. Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) consider a simple model of doublesided moral hazard within a single principal-agent pair, the local government and the TVE. The TVE, and especially its manager, is responsible for running the firm on a day-to-day basis. Yet, because of incomplete markets in the Chinese economy, the local government can play an important role in helping the TVE to obtain some inputs when the TVE faces some bottlenecks or lacks some information on sales channels. The activities of both the firm and the local government require special efforts that contribute to TVE success. In neither case, however, is the effort directly observable by the other party. Moreover, it can be assumed that these two abilities are complements, not substitutes. In particular, the local government could supervise the firm by itself but in a much less efficient way than the manager, just as the firm itself can provide for its needed scarce inputs and connections to markets, only in a much less efficient way than can the local government.
We assume that the contractual arrangement is made in terms of the profit of the firm. Although, as mentioned above, targets may also be specified for other items, such as employment and production, Boisvert and Rozelle (1994) have shown that, in fact, both parties focus primarily on profit since the manager and employees receive a significant bonus paid out of profits and local officials are interested in extracting a portion of the firm's profit for their various purposes.
Let e G and e F represent the level of effort of the local government and of the TVE, respectively. Then, profit can be expressed as a function of these levels of effort f(e F , e G ). We note by the index 1 (2) the derivative of the profit function with respect to its first (second) argument. We assume that f 1 (r, r) ú 0, f 2 (r, r) ú 0, f 12 (r, r) ú 0, f 11 (r, r) õ 0, and f 22 (r, r) õ 0. Moreover, we assume that f(0, e G ) Å 0 and f(e F , 0) Å 0. This last assumption emphasizes the indispensable role of both parties. The cost associated with effort is represented by the functions C(e F ) and D(e G ) which are increasing and convex in effort, while C(r) (CЉ(r)) and D(r) (DЉ(r)) denote their first (second) derivatives, respectively. Last, we assume that both parties are risk neutral. This assumption can be justified by the following considerations. Since the TVEs in our sample are large and mostly located in towns in which there are also several other TVEs, the local government's risk is mitigated by its diversified portfolio of TVEs. The managers and workers, moreover, may also have other options, such as working on their own land or in other TVEs.
As shown by Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) , the optimal sharing rule can be represented by a linear contract. We note by a, the share of the profit remitted by the TVE to the local government, and by Q, the profit quota level paid by the TVE to the local government. Then, we write the problem as
subject to
where k represents the firm's reservation utility level. Constraints (i) and (ii) represent the local government's and the firm's incentive compatibility constraints, respectively. At the optimum, their share of the marginal profitability of the firm with respect to their effort equates to the marginal cost of their effort. Constraint (iii) is the firm's participation constraint in the sense that, if the firm cannot attain at least its reservation level, it will refuse to participate in such a contract. All quantities above k represent some rents for the firm. From (iii), we know that f(e F , e G ) has to be positive; otherwise the firm will not participate. For a positive profit, our previous assumptions imply that both e F and e G are positive. Then the derivatives C(r) and D(r) have positive values. From constraints (i) and (ii), it follows that a is neither 0 nor 1. In other words, with double-sided moral hazard, profit has to be shared between the local government and the firm. We solve the above optimization problem by considering the Lagrangian and computing the first derivatives with respect to its arguments to yield
For any level of a defined by the contract, the local government and the firm will adjust their effort levels so that the contribution of the local government to the sum of the marginal costs of effort weighted by the respective marginal profitability of effort is equal to the share of profit going to the local government. Furthermore, since Q Å (1 0 a)f(e F , e G ) 0 C(e F ) 0 k by constraint (iii), 9 and substituting into (1), the problem is equivalent to maximizing the net joint profit f(e F , e G ) 0 C(e F ) 0 D(e G ). Therefore, the contract that maximizes the local government's payoff also maximizes the total profit of both the local government and the firm.
This conclusion is strikingly different from that of the principal-agent model with moral hazard on the agent's side only. As shown by Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983) , in the absence of risk aversion, the optimal contract in single-sided moral hazard requires a Å 0, implying that a quota contract always dominates a share contract. The share contract can be justified only in the case of a risk-averse agent, so that the agent shares the risks with the principal. Moreover, because the share contract implies some relatively costly monitoring from the principal, a quota contract will be more desirable in general. The simple model of double-sided moral hazard, however, shows that the quota contract is no longer optimal. The intuition is easy to understand. When the firm is the only party to provide effort, it is optimal for the firm to enjoy the entire product of its marginal effort as in a quota contract or a residual contract in which the whole profit goes to the firm. Yet, when both parties provide some effort, it becomes optimal to share the marginal product of the joint effort according to some proportional rule.
However, as markets for capital, energy, and land develop and as the economy becomes more decentralized, the importance of the local government's effort declines and only the effort of the firm affects the profit. A transition to a situation characterized by single-sided moral hazard and the optimality of quota contracts can be induced. In the middle and late eighties, China's markets were still suffering from many distortions, so that it would seem reasonable for the optimal contract to be a share contract. A model with double-sided moral hazard shows that, as long as the effort of the local government is significant to the firm's success, a share contract is optimal. As markets develop and the transition to a market economy continues, the optimal contract will tend to have a lower share of the profit going to the local government but a higher level of quota profit.
The model of Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) can also be used to interpret the trend of contractual arrangements observed in China. Following that model, we assume that both the local government and the firm have particular abilities; the local government provides not fully marketized capital and inputs and connects firms to product markets while the firm supervises workers and management. The share contract affords the opportunity for specialization in the sense that each agent performs the task at which it has an absolute advantage. As a result, profit-sharing emerges in a natural way to achieve a higher level of profit through some resource pooling in the face of the moral hazard problem. This model quantifies the different abilities of both parties so that one hour of the local government's (firm's) time devoted to supervision (management) of the firm is equivalent to only a fraction h 1 (h 2 ) of one hour devoted to supervision (management) by the firm (the local government). They have shown that as h 2 increases relating to h 1 , the share contract will tend toward a quota contract. Therefore, by analogy, when markets for capital and inputs develop sufficiently, quota contracts can become optimal because the effort of the local government is less crucial to the firm and the firm can, by itself, find the necessary capital and inputs to produce. At this point, the supervision role of the local government becomes meaningless and the contractual relationship between the local government and the firm becomes a one-sided moral hazard problem, once again making the quota-profit contract optimal unless the firm exhibits risk aversion.
Since China has not yet completed all the market reforms that would allow the firm to thrive by itself in a competitive nondistorted economic environment, 11 the share contract is still an optimal transitional solution for TVEs and the local government. Therefore, the trend toward quota contracts in the late eighties that Chen (1995) identified, and which is reflected in our sample in Table 1 , could be considered premature.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRACTUAL TYPE ON PROFITABILITY
While there are many alternative explanations of the success of TVEs, e.g. the cooperative culture of rural China, their transactional cost advantages and greater decentralization of decision-making, 12 our maintained hypothesis is that competition, hard budgets, and proper incentive schemes are the major contributing factors. 13 In this section, we explore empirically the effect of the contractual arrangement on the performance, or profitability, of a TVE under Chinese institutional conditions.
Factors affecting the profitability of an enterprise are many. Among those discussed in the literature are the type of contract, monopoly power in factor and/or product markets, product type, proximity to the metropolitan area, relationships with foreign enterprises and SOEs, technological access, and other characteristics of the economic and social environment. To isolate the relationship between the performance of an enterprise and the type of contractual arrangement, one must control for the impact of all the other factors. Aggregate time series data are neither particularly useful for distinguishing among hypotheses that depend on microeconomic attributes nor able to provide sufficient variation in these variables to allow an investigator to identify their effects. The use of cross-sectional data, on the other hand, may reflect interfirm differences to a greater extent than the differences in contractual relations. By studying the effects on firm profitability when contract terms change, we can separate interfirm differences from intrafirm contractual differences. This requires the use of panel data with observations for a number of enterprises over a certain period of time.
Fortunately, the aforementioned national sample survey of 200 large TVEs powered incentives like share contracts will be preferred to high-powered incentives like residual claimant ones. In such conditions, even with high-powered incentives, it becomes difficult for the local government to extract rents from firms. At the same time, low-powered incentives can help reduce problems such as the abuse of power and embezzlement on the part of managers. 11 Indeed, according Huang (1990) , this situation is likely to remain for the foreseenable future. 12 See, e.g., Nee (1992), Weitzman and Xu (1994), Qian and Weingast (1994) . 13 For evidence supporting this hypothesis based on the same data set used here, see Nugent, Perrigne, and Qiu (1996) .
for the years 1985 to 1990 provides the relevant data. TVEs from 10 provinces were chosen to represent a wide variety of environmental conditions. From these 10 provinces, 319 counties were selected by virtue of having within them staff from the National Statistical Bureau of China. Local leaders and TVE bureaus in each of these counties were asked to identify three to five of their largest TVEs. This resulted in a list of 1264 large TVEs from which the sample of 200 was randomly selected, having 20 from each of the 10 provinces.
14 The survey questionnaires contain detailed information on the operations of a TVE. However, only in 1985 However, only in , 1989 , and 1990 did they ask for information on contractual arrangements. Unfortunately, information on many of the factors that are considered important in affecting the performance of an enterprise such as proximity to market, monopoly power, relations to local government, SOEs, or foreign enterprises was not collected. However, their effects on enterprise profitability could be expected to remain relatively constant in the short run, although varying substantially from one firm to another. Therefore, we control for their effects by including a firm-specific variable and specify the model as
for i Å 1, . . . , 200, t Å 1985, 1989, 1990 , where y it denotes the ith firm's before-tax net profit rate, relative to total assets at time t; d itj is the contractual dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ith firm at the tth time period is under the jth type of contractual arrangement, and 0 otherwise, j Å 1, 2, . . . , M; d 1989 and d 1990 are time dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the observation is from 1989 and 1990, respectively, and 0 otherwise; a i is the firm-specific effect on profitability, such as the type of product, monopoly power, and proximity to the market 15 ; x it are other observed individual and time-varying explanatory variables; and u it is the error term, representing the combined effects of all other unobserved variables that vary across i and over t and, it is assumed to be orthogonal to the included explanatory variables.
Among the available individual and time-varying explanatory variables x it are bonuses, i.e., bonus payments as a percentage of the total wage bill, and electricity, i.e., the percentage of electricity purchased at planned price. 16 These variables are expected to have positive influences on y it . In the case of bonus, managerial and workers efficiency could be expected to rise with better incentives. In the case of electricity, in each of the years there was excess demand for electricity with evidence that firms could not get all the electricity they wanted at the official price. Since each of these variables could have independent effects on firm profitability, their inclusion is to determine whether the effects of observed changes in contract type on y it , i.e. b j , would hold even after accounting for them. Specifically, the coefficient b j provides a measure of the incentive or disincentive effect of the jth type of contractual arrangement relative to the zero type of contract on enterprise profitability after controlling for the effects of other factors. The coefficients d 1 and d 2 provide estimates of the effect of tightened credit and other macroeconomic conditions on the overall profitability of TVEs in 1989 and 1990, respectively.
All the right-hand side variables, except for bonuses, are assumed to be exogenous in the determination of y it . The contract types are treated as exogenous because, even if their choice depended on enterprise profitability, the decisions would have been made prior to the year in which profits are realized. In all cases, since the contract type is specified at the beginning of the year during which profits are generated. In other words, even if there is a relationship between contract type and profits, it is expected to be recursive and not contemporary in the sense that the current type of contract is determined by past performance while the current performance is a function of the current contract, not of the expected contract arrangement. The percentage of electricity purchased at planned prices is used as a proxy for local government effort, which is an argument in our profit function. The key parameters for testing the empirical relevance of the model of Section 2 are the b j s because they reflect the influence of the contract type.
Due to changes in the questionnaires over time, seven types of contracts were recorded at some time. After examining the related questions, we reclassified them into five categories, namely, all profits going to government (ALLG), all profits going to enterprises (ALLTVE), quota profit (QP), share profit (SP), and others (OTH). Because only eight enterprises in 1989 were under the category of all profits going to enterprises, we were not able to obtain a statistically significant estimate of the coefficient of this dummy variable. Moreover, since most firms in the others category were essentially private and the point estimate for the coefficient of ALL- Note. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Columns (1) to (4) provide OLS estimates while columns (5) and (6) provide instrumental variable 2SLS estimates.
TVE was not much different from that of the others dummy variable, we regroup the types of contract into four categories by combining all profits going to enterprise and others as one category (OTH). 17 Treating the category of all profits going to government as the reference group, i.e., the zero type, we are left with three other contractual dummy variables, SP, QP, and OTH, time dummy variables for 1989 and 1990, the electricity variable, and, subsequently, the bonus variable. Because of some missing data on the percentage of electricity purchased at the official price variable, we are left with only 471 observations in the panel when all explanatory variables are included.
Since we are not particularly interested in the values of the firm-specific dummies, a i , the remaining coefficients of Eq. (3) can be estimated conveniently in difference-from-the-mean form, i.e. the ''within method'' (Hsiao, 1986) . The least squares estimates of the relevant parameters are presented in Table 2 . To check the sensitivity of the estimates, column (1) reports the results for the maximum sample available (552 observations) for the variables included in this specification. The corresponding results for the minimum sample of 471 observations (usable for the full specification given in column (4)) are presented in column (2). In columns (3) and (4) we provide the least squares estimates of the model that includes the percentage of electricity purchased at planned prices and subsequently the bonus variable.
18 Finally, since there are concerns about the joint dependency between profit rate, contract type dummies, and bonus variables, in columns (5) and (6) we provide the Lewbel (1997) instrumental variable estimates of the model when the percentage of electricity purchased at the planned price and, subsequently, the bonus are included. 19 In general, the estimates are quite robust to the sample used and to the choice of specification. The closeness between the least squares and instrumental variable estimates also suggest that we may treat contract type dummies as exogenous.
The estimated coefficients for the 1989 and 1990 time dummy variables are negative and highly significant in all specifications and samples. This validates the severe negative effect of government retrenchment in monetary and fiscal policies on the profitability of TVEs, even after controlling for other variables. The coefficients of both the bonus and electricity in columns (4) and (6) are positive and significant, supporting the hypothesized relevance of the incentive effect and the allocation of electricity at planned prices to firm profitability. Considering the loss of efficiency of the instrumental variable estimates, our preferred specification is that of column (3) in which only the percentage of electricity purchased at the planned price is added to the basic model. In this case, the coefficients of the contractual dummy variables for QP, SP, and OTH are all positive, relative to the excluded ALLG contract. A test of the null hypothesis H 0 : b 1 Å b 2 Å b 3 Å 0 yields an F-value of 7.57 with 3 and 308 degrees of freedom in the numerator and denominator, respectively, which is significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that, relative to the contractual arrangement in which all profits go to the government, each version of the responsibility system has a positive incentive effect on enterprise profitability.
We then test for differences in incentive effects across the different versions of the responsibility system by formulating the null hypothesis as H* 0 :
The F-value is 5.08 with degrees of freedom 2 and 308, respectively. It again rejects the hypothesis that the performance of an enterprise is indifferent to the type of contract used. These results appear to support 18 The interpretation of the electricity variable will be discussed further in Section 4. 19 Column (5) is estimated by treating contract dummies as jointly dependent. Column (6) is estimated by treating both the contract dummies and bonus variable as joint dependent variables. Since it is difficult to find other instruments, we follow the suggestion of Lewbel (1997) and use higher moments of the variables as instruments. The instruments we use are:
the contention that, relative to the contractual arrangement in which all profits go to the local government, all different forms of the responsibility system have positive incentive effects on enterprise profitability but that their effects vary from one type to another.
Since the coefficient of the SP contract dummy is larger than that of the QP contract dummy (0.1343 vs 0.0816), we test for the statistical significance of this difference. The F-value of the null hypothesis H** 0 : b 1 Å b 2 is 8.07 with 1 and 308 degrees of freedom in the numerator and denominator, respectively. It is significant at the 1% level. Thus, we conclude that, not only is there a significant difference in the incentive effect between QP and SP contracts, but also, under Chinese conditions at least, SP contracts provide better incentives than QP contracts. Indeed, on average, the difference in the net profit rate between a firm under SP and the same firm under QP contracts is about 5%. This result is interesting considering that in the late 1980s most TVEs were under either QP or SP contracts and there was a sharp trend from SP to QP contracts, perhaps inspired by standard economic theory, i.e., the single-sided moral hazard model, predicting that QP contracts provide greater incentives for raising profits than SP contracts. Notably, the differences in the point estimates of the coefficients for SP and QP contracts are quite robust to the differences in specifications and samples.
EVIDENCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT EFFORT
The previous section, and in particular Table 2 , has offered evidence that, despite the presumed incentive advantages of QP contracts for firm profitability, after controlling for factors such as the year, firm-specific characteristics and bonus, a change from SP to QP contracts during the years [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] had the effect of reducing the net profit rate by about 5% on average. The purpose of this section is to provide evidence of the importance of local government effort and, therefore, of the relevance of the model of the doublesided moral hazard. The evidence offered is based on the national surveys for the years 1985, 1989, and 1990 , which are again the only ones containing the relevant information.
Some indications of market incompleteness and underdevelopment, and accordingly of the potential role for local government in providing access to nonmarketed inputs and outputs, are provided in Table 3 . The top of Table  3 presents data on the average degree of shortfall in the supply of raw materials, coal, and electricity for 1985 and 1989 . In all three cases, the shortfalls are not inconsequential. 20 Even more telling is the fact that well over half the sample firms in both 1985 and 1989 characterized their supply of raw materials and energy as ''fluctuating and/or getting worse'' over time.
Virtually all firms in the sample were also highly dependent on short-term bank credit for financing their operations. This is reflected in the sizable shares of short-term bank loans in total assets in all years but especially in the most difficult years, 1989 and 1990 . Toward the bottom of the table is evidence that, throughout the period, no less than 50% of all production of the sample TVEs was sold to SOEs and in foreign markets. Naturally, ruralbased TVEs, whose managers had generally never been out of the county in which their TVEs were located, could hardly be expected to have easy and familiar access to those markets, once again suggesting that the local government officials could be of great assistance to TVEs in these respects.
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With respect to the input markets, there is some evidence that the local government gives help to TVEs when markets are tight. Indeed, from the middle section of Table 3 , it can been seen that nonmarket sources, including county and township governments, constituted a rather important source of major raw materials during 1985 and 1989, although this source was declining sharply over time. Since county and township governments themselves were an important source of supply for such raw materials, it is obvious that local government officials, i.e., the owner-supervisors of TVEs, could be of considerable use to TVEs in obtaining these scarce raw materials. Note also the relatively high shares of coal, natural gas, and electricity purchased at the official prices and, hence, from government itself or SOEs. Since official prices were often well below market prices, help in obtaining these products at official prices would constitute an additional potential assistance role from the local government.
Taken together, these data indicate the relevance of TVE owners, in practice the local governments, for overcoming the incompleteness of various markets, e.g. raw materials, energy, credit, and output, that were of critical importance to TVEs, at least during the period under study. Naturally, this does not imply necessarily that only TVEs with SP contracts receive such help from local governments. Indeed, since the local government as owner of all TVEs in its area benefit from the revenues of all nonfailing TVEs, it has an incentive to help all of its TVEs. Nevertheless, since the incentives to local government officials for assisting TVEs are greater if the local government participates as a partial claimant to the residual profits, it seems plausible that TVEs under SP contracts benefit to a greater extent than those under QP and other contracts.
Is there any evidence that firms under SP contracts receive more help from local government than those under QP contracts? Indeed, some rows in Table  3 provide data on many of these same inputs and outputs but distinguish between SP and QP contracts in each of the same years. First, perhaps the single most comprehensive indicator of the advantage of SP contracts among sample TVEs is the entry showing that, in 1990, 88.9% of the respondents in TVEs under SP contracts said that, when help was needed, the TVE would get that help from the local government, as opposed to 73.2% in the case of TVEs under QP contracts. As noted above, both the degree of market incompleteness and the share of SP contracts were declining over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . For this reason, it is not surprising that there is substantial variation from year to year with respect to the SP-QP differences. For example, in the case of each form of energy, QP-contract TVEs obtained larger percentages of these inputs at official prices than SP-contract TVEs in 1985, whereas in both 1989 and 1990 the reverse was true.
22
In all other cases, except for energy, SP-contract TVEs seem to benefit from greater effort by the local government in each year. In particular, they obtained larger percentages of the major raw materials from nonmarket sources in general and from the local government in particular. The entries on raw materials in the first several rows of this section of the table are relatively more important and more comprehensive than the less consistent ones for energy for two reasons. First, these entries come from the manager himself, 23 rather than from the accountant as in the case of energy purchases, which come from the quantitative surveys. Second, the entries are more comprehensive in that they include all major raw materials including energy. Even in the case of energy, by 1990 the differentials in favor of TVEs under SP contracts were rather substantial. Finally, SP-contract TVEs sold more of their output to SOEs and foreign markets than TVEs under QP contracts. Table 4 reports the test outcomes to discern the statistical significance of these differences for 1989 data. The differences are significant at the 5% level in the case of the comprehensive measure of raw materials and energy coming from the manager himself, as well as in the case of the percentage of sales going to firms, i.e., SOEs, TVEs, and exports, instead of directly to local customers. In all such cases, these indicators of greater effort on the part of the local government are higher for SP contracts than for QP contracts.
To evaluate further the effect of local government efforts on TVE profitability, we added the percentage of electricity purchased at the official price as an additional explanatory variable in the net profit rate equation (3). We chose this variable as a proxy for local government effort because of the relatively large number of observations available. Columns (2) and (3) of 22 One factor contributing to the difference between 1985 and the other two years with respect to the relevance of greater local government effort in the case of SP-contract TVEs may be that in 1985 but not in the other years, the percentage of QP-TVEs supervised at the county level, i.e., the highest level of local government, and that best able to provide help was greater, indeed considerably greater, for QP-contract TVEs than for SP-contract TVEs. 23 The manager is considerably more highly rewarded than the accountant so that he may be presumed to have more reliable and comprehensive information at his disposal. Note. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. Table 2 provide the estimates of the net profit equation with or without this variable, based on the available observations. The impact of this variable is indeed positive and highly significant. However, it is interesting to note that, although the difference between SP and QP remains statistically significant since the F statistic is 8.07 with degrees of freedom 1 and 308, respectively, both the SP and QP contract dummy coefficients are reduced with the inclusion of this additional explanatory variable. Nevertheless, the reduction in the SP-contract coefficient of 0.008 (from 0.1423 to 0.1343) is almost twice the reduction of 0.0049 in the QP-contract (from 0.0865 to 0.0816). This may provide indirect evidence of greater effort by the local government on behalf of the enterprises under SP contracts than under QP contracts. Even after taking the proxy for local government effort into consideration, share contracts still have better incentive effects than quota contracts under Chinese conditions. This section presents evidence to support the hypothesized doublesided moral hazard explanation of why QP contracts are less advantageous than generally expected on the basis of the standard single-sided moral hazard model.
CONCLUSION
Quota contracts are generally perceived to have superior incentive properties than share contracts based on models using standard environmental conditions from developed countries such as perfectly competitive markets and contractual terms that are not subject to arbitrary changes by one of the parties. In rural China, such conditions were not fulfilled during the period under study. Various imperfections in Chinese product and factor markets present an important opportunity for effort of the local government on the firm's behalf. When such features are incorporated into a simple, but otherwise standard, model, we show that the share profit contract may have greater incentive effects than the quota profit contract from the perspective of profit maximization. Using a national survey of 200 large TVEs from 1985 to 1990, we demonstrate empirically that the observed trend from share profit to quota profit contracts may have been ill suited to Chinese conditions.
